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REVIEW ESSAY
TOWARD A NOTION OF
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ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG*
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On November 7, 2000, while most people in the United States
focused on the question of who our next President was going to be,
lawyers for the American Trucking Associations and other industry
groups argued to the Supreme Court that the Environmental Pro
tection Agency ("EPA") should set the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards ("NAAQS") under the Clean Air Act through a
cost-benefit analysis. 1 The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to set
NAAQS-numeric limitations on the concentrations of various air
pollutants, such as particulates or sulfur dioxide-at levels that
"protect the public health" and "protect the public welfare from
any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the pres
ence of such air pollutant in the ambient air."2 Federal courts have
upheld the EPA's authority to set NAAQS to ensure that human
health is protected, even when the exact harms from a given pollu
tant are uncertain. 3 Nevertheless, on appeal before the Supreme
* Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law.
J.D., 1996, Lewis & Clark School of Law; Ph.D., 1993, University of California; M.A.,
1986, The Johns Hopkins University. I would like to thank the Editorial Board of the
Western New England Law Review for inviting me to submit this review essay. Com
ments may be directed to me at rcraig@law.wnec.edu or through my web site, http://
www.wneclaw.wnec.edu/faculty/craigldefault.html.
1. Linda Greenhouse, Attack on Clean Air Act Falters in High Court Arguments,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2000, at A20.
2. 42 U.S.c. § 7409(b)(1)-(2) (1994).
3. See, e.g., Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1151-53 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(rejecting an industry argument that the EPA can only protect against health effects
that are clearly harmful or clearly adverse).
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Court, industry lawyers argued that environmental regulation
should be a matter of economics.
The industry groups' arguments regarding NAAQS emphasize
that the interaction of economics and environmental integrity is the
focus of much of the debate over American environmental policy.
Unfortunately, popular environmental policy discussion often inter
prets concerns over ecological integrity as threats to human pros
perity. In popular media, for example, news stories pose stark
choices to the American people: do we want salmon or cheap
power, spotted owls or a thriving timber industry, "surplus" tuna
swimming in the sea or employed fishers, interfering governments
or strong property rights?
Such presentations are, of course, reductionist. Nevertheless,
they highlight a disjunction that currently permeates much of the
American debate over environmental policy-namely, that the
question of how to value human welfare has come to be perceived
as a different question from how to value an increasingly abstract
concept of "the environment." Except during the occasional natu
ral disaster, when the immediate connection between "the environ
ment" and everyday human life cannot be ignored, Americans
often have the luxury of viewing the natural ecosystems that sur
round them as something "other," distinct and separate from
human existence. We are a nation with many people who spend
their lives largely insulated from any direct contact with the envi
ronment: water comes from the tap, food comes from the supermar
ket, sewage "disappears" down a pipe, garbage is hauled "away."4
In its early stages, federal environmental law often benefited
from headliner problems that made the need for better environ
mental protections obvious, including cholera outbreaks from un
treated sewage dumped into waterways, rivers so polluted that they
could catch on fire, smog-filled airsheds that required frequent
health alerts, and toxic soups of poorly-disposed chemicals bubbling
up into homeowners' basements. In a culture where intimate and
frequent contact with natural ecosystems is increasingly rare, how
ever, the impetus for protecting the environment can quickly lose
any sense of anthropocentric self-interest. Ironically, the fact that
nearly three decades of environmental legislation has in fact re
4. See James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887, 888
(1997) ("The general ignorance of ecosystem services is partly the result of modern
society's dissociation between computers, cars and clothing on the one hand and bi
odiversity, nutrient cycling, and pollination on the other. ").
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duced the frequency with which environmental problems impinge
on Americans' daily lives has only served to further obscure the
direct connections between humans and environmental protection.
Environmentalism in the current American culture runs a real risk
of becoming mere altruism-an impulse to protect the environment
based on something other than a perception of direct benefit to the
protector.
Altruism may be a noble motivation, and there is merit to the
idea that nature has its own intrinsic value quite apart from what we
humans might do with it. Nevertheless, in the realm of politics and
policy, self-interest is a much more reliable basis than altruism for
any long-term commitment to sustaining a productive and healthy
environment for generations to come. Self-interest can compel
people to act in desired ways long after altruism becomes too ex
pensive or inconvenient to maintain.
Not all types of self-interest serve the goals of environmental
protection, however. At the other end of the spectrum from altru
ism, for instance, is the view that the environment is first, last, and
foremost a source of raw materials and goods that create private
wealth-food, minerals, timber, and so on. From this perspective,
the environment is valuable because humans can directly, and often
exploitatively, make use of it. Many such uses, moreover, are easily
describable through neoclassic economic analyses of supply and de
mand and market efficiency-the cutting and sale of timber, the
catch and sale of fish, the mining and processing and sale of metals.
The problem with this consumer view is that many aspects of
the environment get left out of economic calculations and cost-ben
efit analyses. The American Trucking Associations were well aware
of this phenomenon when they suggested cost-benefit calculations
as the solution to the NAAQS "problem." The problems that result
from ready access to air or water for was.te disposal or from de
nuded or mined lands have traditionally been externalities that no
one had to pay for. 5 As a result, decisions that make perfect sense
5. See Christine M. Augustyniak, Economic Valuation of Services Provided by
Natural Resources: Putting a Price on the "Priceless," 45 BAYLOR L. REV. 389, 389
(1993) ("[F]ailing to attach values to natural resources in a policy framework results in
those resources being treated as though they have zero price, i.e., the resources are
'valueless."'); see also Robert Costanza et aI., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Ser
vices and Natural Capital, 387 NATURE 253, 253 (1997) ("Because ecosystem services
are not fully 'captured' in commercial markets or adequately quantified in terms com
parable with economic services and manufactured capital, they are often given too little
weight in policy decisions."); Salzman, supra note 4, at 888 ("The primary reason that
ecosystem services are taken for granted, however, is that they are free .... [T]he ser
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in the terms of pure neoclassical economics can leave air unbreath
able, water undrinkable, and landscapes barren and poisoned.
One of the more important developments in the economics of
environmental protection has been the rise of ecological econom
ics,6 a discipline that seeks to unify (or perhaps more accurately, re
unify) the issues of valuing the environment and valuing the quality
of human life. The key concept for ecological economics is ecosys
tem services-those basic life-supporting services that the environ
ment provides, such as "purification of air and water, pest control,
renewal of soil fertility, climate regulation, pollination of crops and
vegetation, and waste detoxification and decomposition."7
By identifying and valuing ecosystem services, ecological eco
nomics seeks to force people to recognize their intimate depen
dency on the environment, including their dependency on distant
ecosystems, and to factor that dependency into policy decisions re
garding the environment. For example, in one of the more famous
decisions based on recognizing the value to humans of ecosystem
services, New York City chose to restore the ecological integrity of
the Catskill Mountains in order to re-establish a pure supply of
drinking water, rather than building a water purification plant. The
city's reason for doing so was simple: it was cheaper ($660 million
as opposed to $4 billion) to restore the mountain ecosystem than it
was to build and maintain a technological substitute for the purifi
cation services that an intact ecosystem could provide. 8
There are other indications that the economics of ecosystem
services could be an effective catalyst in re-establishing environ
mental protection as an intrinsically anthropocentric issue-that is,
as not just a matter of saving whales or spotted owls or a few hun
dred flies in southern California, but as the key to preserving our
selves and future generations of human beings. In a controversial
but influential 1997 study, a group of ecological economists esti
vices underpinning [ecosystem] goods generally have no market value -not because
they are worthless, but rather because there is no market to capture and express their
value directly.").
6. Ehsan Masood & Laura Garwin, Costing the Earth: When Ecology Meets Eco
nomics, 395 NATURE 426, 426-27 (1998).
7. Salzman, supra note 4, at 887-88; see also Costanza et aI., supra note 5, at 254
(identifying seventeen ecosystem services, including: gas regulation, climate regulation,
disturbance regulation, water regulation, water supply, erosion control and sediment
retention, soil formation, nutrient cycling, waste treatment, pollination, biological con
trol, refugia, food production, raw materials, genetic resources, recreation, and cultural
services).
8. Salzman, supra note 4, at 893-94.
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mated that the value of the world's ecosystem services is approxi
mately $33 trillion, or 1.8 times as large as the global GNP.9
Environmental lawyers, moreover, have been quick to suggest that
the concept of valued ecosystem services could bring profound
changes in certain aspects of environmental law. Such changes
could range from "influenc[ing] the process of natural resource
damage assessment under CERCLA, the Oil Pollution Act, and
similar federal and state laws" to reformation of "some existing le
gal regimes [that] pose barriers" to using the ecosystem services
concept, including "[w]ater rights, federal land multiple use man
dates, below-cost timber sales, [and] tax and subsidy structures."10
Against this background, Eric A. Davidson has submitted his
own attempt to re-connect Americans to their environment, You
Can't Eat GNP: Economics As If Ecology Mattered ("You Can't Eat
GNP").!l His argument is clearly and openly stated early in the
book:
We may not need to think about tilling the fields every day, but
we had better not lose sight of the fact that our wealth and our
comfort are derived from a combination of natural resources
soil, water, air, forests, oceans, mineral deposits, climate-and
the skill and ingenuity with which we utilize and manage those
resources. If we neglect or abuse those natural resources, we un
dermine our own prosperity.12

Davidson begins his exposition on this subject by identifying
three fallacies of neoclassical economics: "Marie Antoinette eco
nomics,"13 "Custer's folly,"l4 and "false complacency from partial
success."15 The fallacy of Marie Antoinette economics arises when
9. Costanza et aI., supra note 5, at 259. By changing some beginning assumptions,
the researchers calculated the range of possible values for the world's ecosystem ser
vices to be $16 to $54 trillion. Id.
10. J. B. Ruhl, Valuing Nature's Services: The Future of Environmental Law, 13
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 359, 361 (1998); see also Salzman, supra note 4, at 898-903
(outlining how the concept of ecosystem services could offer environmental law "speci
ficity of indicators" that environmental harm has occurred, increasing potential causes
of action; "specificity of causation" as to the source(s) of environmental harm, influenc
ing environmental standing and Commerce Clause challenges; and a "persuasive argu
ment that biodiversity and habitat protection provide important benefits in ways not
normally considered").
11. ERIC A. DAVIDSON, You CAN'T EAT GNP: ECONOMICS AS IF ECOLOGY
MATTERED (2000).
12. Id. at 6.
13. Id. at 7.
14. Id. at 8.
15. Id. at 11.
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economists treat various segments of the GNP as interchangeable,
like the economist who considered global warming an insignificant
problem because it would affect only agriculture, which makes up a
mere 3% of the nation's GNP.1 6 Davidson's point is that when
crops fail, people go hungry, regardless of whether the other 97%
of the GNP is unaffectedP And it probably won't be unaffected,
because "the economic system will fail if the ecological system is
not carefully managed. The inverse, which is also true, is that a
failed economic systemccreates desperate people who will destroy
the ecological system. "18
The fallacy of Custer's folly is the belief that new and better
technology, like the cavalry, will always save us from ecological dis
aster. 19 While Davidson welcomes any helpful technology that
comes along, he also advises prudence and caution in our use of our
environment:
[W]e had best not rely solely on future technological develop
ments to clean up the messes that we are now making with our
current bad habits. Prudence dictates that we slow population
growth, prevent soil erosion, conserve groundwater, and stop
polluting the atmosphere. Future generations will benefit from
these essential natural resources under any scenario of techno
logical development. 2o

The fallacy of false complacency arises from the successes that
environmental law has already secured, and Davidson's point is that
some progress in cleaning up our air and water should not prompt
us to think that we have taken care of our environmental problems:
A bit of progress is no reason for complacency in a world where
forests are being converted to ranches, farms, and abandoned
land at an astounding rate, where the genetic diversity of plants
and animals is declining and species are going extinct at unprece
dented speed, where fisheries are collapsing, where soil is erod
ing faster than it can be regenerated, where heat-trapping gases
are accumulating in the atmosphere, and where groundwater is
becoming depleted and contaminated. 21

As the title of Davidson's book indicates, he is interested in
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 7.
at 8.
at 9.
at 11.
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food, or, more broadly, basic survival. His view of ecological eco
nomics, therefore, appropriately starts with the soil. Farming
throughout the world, as Davidson describes it, has long been a
process of exposing and depleting fertile topsoils, then abandoning
those lands for new ones, leaving the used-up soils to erode under
the forces of water and wind.22 Davidson focuses on cotton farm
ing, a notoriously soil~destructive crop,23 but the reader can also
recall the Great Dust Bowl of the 1930s to support Davidson's pic
ture. Davidson then contrasts the neoclassical economist's and the
ecologist's views of such farming practices:
Economists would argue that these farmers were acting rationally
in terms of doing what provided them the greatest profit for their
investments of capital and labor. Ecologists, on the other hand,
see a sad, irrational legacy of abuse of the land by previous gen
erations, which limits the potential use of the land today and for
several generations to come. 24

Indeed, Davidson stresses, humans' continued survival at present
population levels has depended heavily on technological advances
in agriculture, such as chemical fertilizers and pesticides, rather
than on our stewardship of naturally fertile soils.25 But we must
resist the temptation to take good soils for granted and to fall into
Custer's folly regarding further technological advances, because:
Soil is more than dirt. It is a complex mixture of minerals and
organic matter that can provide a rich medium for abundant
plant growth. It takes a long time, however, for Mother Nature
to make good, fertile topsoil. Dead leaves and roots are gradu
ally mixed with the clay minerals by the activity of worms, mites,
bacteria, and other organisms living in the soil. This mixture has
the right combination of nutrients, aeration, and water-holding
properties to nourish the plants. When the topsoil is eroded
away, exposing the deeper subsoil layers that have not developed
this rich mixture of organic matter with minerals, abundant plant
growth cannot be supported. Depending on the climate and the
type of vegetation, the formation of an inch of new topsoil can
require anywhere from fifty years to several hundred years. 26

A number of Davidson's more general themes emerge as he
discusses soil. First, Davidson stresses throughout his arguments
22.
23.

24.
25.
26.

[d. at 16.
[d. at 15-17.
[d. at 17.
[d. at 18.
[d. at 23-24.
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that when humans use environmental natural capital without an
ecological perspective, they often cause other environmental
problems that are far more difficult and expensive to solve. 27 For
example, the chemical fertilizers and pesticides that preserve and
enhance soil productivity pollute surface and groundwater. 28 Nev
ertheless, under neoclassical economics, the farmer's decision to ap
ply excess fertilizers and pesticides to crops makes perfect sense
even though the farmer knows that some will be washed away, be
cause the cost of polluting the water is an externality for which the
farmer pays nothing. 29
But what about the Clean Water Act?,3° the reader may won
der. While it is true that environmental regulation can force pol
luters to think about externalities that would otherwise be "free"
and force them, in some sense, to "pay" for their pollution through
permit requirements and fees, Davidson's farming example is a par
ticularly apt choice to demonstrate the gaps in current American
environmental law. Farmers enjoy several exemptions from envi
ronmental mandates that might otherwise force them to take ac
count of the costs of pollution. 31 For example, farmers are not
forced to comply with the federal Clean Water Act's general re
quirement that persons discharging pollutants into waterways have
a permit. 32 Rather than being regulated, therefore:
The fertilizer that makes crops grow better while still on the
farmer's field also makes unwanted algae grow better in streams
and lakes, which chokes out the native aquatic plants, depletes
oxygen in the water that the fish need, and destroys the natural
food chain. Some of the fertilizer and pesticide also make their
way into the groundwater, which is out of sight but a vital source
of drinking water and irrigation water in many regions of the
world. 33

As a result, the local problem of how one farmer grows the largest
27. Id. at 121-24.
28. Id. at 124-29.
29. See id. at 122.
30. Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.c. §§ 1251-1376
(1994).
31. For a discussion of the numerous exemptions from environmental regulation
that farms and farmers enjoy, see generally J. B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental
Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 293-327 (2000).
32. See 33 U.S.c. § 1311(a) (making it illegal for any person to discharge a pollu
tant into a navigable water except in compliance with the federal Clean Water Act);
§ 1342(e)(I) (allowing an exception for the discharge of agricultural pollutants).
33. DAVIDSON, supra note 11, at 122-23.
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crop possible becomes a regional problem of water pollution, and,
as Davidson points out, "[l]ocal problems are almost always easier
to solve than are regional ones."34 Groundwater in particular can
take several hundred or even thousands of years to flush out and
recharge naturally.35
The lengths of time involved in soil regeneration and ground
water replenishment underscore Davidson's second theme: a long
term, multi-generational view of ecology and economics that de
fines "success" not by quarterly or yearly profits but by the sus
tainability of ecosystem services and the quality of the planet left to
the next several generations of humans. Davidson criticizes short
term thinking throughout his analysis, while still recognizing that
most people can and will yield to the temptation to ignore the needs
of future generations. Thus, "we know that protecting natural re
sources for the benefit of future generations is the right thing to do,
but we often yield to the temptation of ignoring the well-being of
future generations for the sake of more consumption in the short
term."36 This regard for future generations is a hallmark of ecologi
cal economics, which "aims to provide a framework for the equita
ble distribution of resources and property rights within the present
generation of humans, between current and future generations and
between humans and other species."37
The structure of this framework, and the related criticism of
current economics, policy, and law, is the third and most important
theme in You Can't Eat GNP. In the case of soils, for example,
Davidson recognizes that:
The problem is not that we are dumb-we understand why the
soil becomes degraded and how to avoid it-but that collectively
we are forgetful, some of us are greedy, and some are desperate.
And there is no shortage of inept managers and policymakers
ready to condone and implement practices based on greed and
desperation. 38

He criticizes current policies, such as subsidies for irrigation water,
that encourage environmentally-damaging practices, and lauds
those, like the Conservation Reserve Program, which encourages
farmers to conserve easily-erodible land, that encourage long-term
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

[d. at 123.
[d. at 125.
[d. at 69.
Masood & Garwin, supra note 6, at 427.
DAVIDSON, supra note 11, at 31.
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ecological sustain ability. Nevertheless, Davidson has a much larger
goal in mind than retooling individual regulatory programs. He
wants "an economic system that is designed to value the future at
least as much as the present. "39
You Can't Eat GNP pursues this ultimate goal in primarily two
ways: (1) by attacking cost-benefit analyses as they are currently
performed in environmental law and policy; and (2) by suggesting
steps that Americans can take to implement sustainable policies of
ecological economics. Davidson devotes two of his nine chapters to
cost-benefit analyses, emphasizing that "many of the benefits of en
vironmental protection are left out of the balance sheet entirely be
cause they are too difficult or impossible to calculate by standard
neoclassical economics."40 In particular, Davidson highlights two
problems with cost-benefit analyses based on principles from neo
classical economics: valuation at the margin and discounting to pre
sent value.
Marginal valuation relies on the prices for limited numbers of
goods or services traded on the open market in accordance with the
law of supply and demand. As a result, it both fractionalizes the
potential value of functional ecosystems and ignores those services
for which ready markets do not exist. Marginal valuation thus re
sults in cost-benefit analyses that do not fully account for the value
in leaving ecosystems intact and undamaged, creating a bias toward
using and exploiting the environment. By increasing the value
placed on intact ecosystems, the concept of ecosystem services
could, Davidson admits, legitimize some cost-benefit analyses for
environmental decision-making, "as long as the inadequacies of the
monetary estimates of ecosystem services are recognized. "41 When
policymakers recognize that ecosystem services exist and have mon
etary value, they should be less likely to favor choices that impair
those ecosystems.
Nevertheless, even ecosystem services suffer from pricing at
the margin, and "[t]he value to humanity of the many products and
services provided by [the environment] may be greater than the
sum of the many small parts calculated at the margin. "42 As a re
sult, Davidson remains skeptical of environmental cost-benefit
analyses, even if ecosystem services become a standard part of the
39.
40.
41.

42.

[d.
[d.
/d.
[d.

at
at
at
at

77.
39.
48.
56.
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balancing equation. "The right prices for ecosystem services, and
the marginal valuation method upon which these are based, are
useful tools for many inevitable decisions about trade-offs, but they
may be inadequate to conserve the natural resources that we will
need at large scales for long-term economic and ecological prosper
ity."43 Instead, our economic and political systems have to recog
nize and account for the fact that certain resources such as "soil,
fresh water, air, forests, and oceans ... are essential, irreplaceable,
and nonsubstitutable"44-"that the economic system cannot exist
without the ecological system."45
If valuation at the margin undervalues intact ecosystems and
natural capital, then discounting in cost-benefit analyses favors pre
sent use over long-term sustainability. Discounting is the process of
calculating the present value of an economic decision, allowing
ready comparison of various options. In Davidson's example, a log
ging company might be deciding whether to cut a stand of timber
this year or wait until next year. This year, the trees are worth
$1000, which the company could then invest for a year and earn 8%
interest, giving the company a total profit a year from now of $1080.
Alternatively, the company could wait a year to cut the trees, which
would then be worth $1050 because they were slightly bigger. The
company would, however, have lost out on the interest for a year,
and thus the trees are actually worth more if cut now rather than
later. Discounting to present value, again assuming an 8% return
rate, the timber is worth $1000 now if cut and $969 now if left
standing.
So far, this is all standard economics. Davidson, however, chal
lenges the whole notion of discounting, arguing that "[a]ny parent
or grandparent knows that there is something wrong with this no
tion that the future is worth less than the present. "46 What dis
counting ignores is the interim and future value of the intact
ecosystem. For instance, in the timber example, discounting com
pletely leaves out the value of having standing trees and the ser
vices they provide (erosion control, gas exchange, root habitat) for
an additional year, plus the value of still having the option to cut or
not cut a year from now. While Davidson acknowledges that one
problem may be the choice of discount rate-lower discount rates
43.
44.
45.
46.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at
at
at
at

58.
55.
59.
68.
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tend to encourage people to leave the environment intact, while
higher discount rates encourage immediate use and exploitation
he more strongly argues that the present generation needs to act
according to the precautionary principle. That is, the current gener
ation needs to be willing to accept the current costs of environmen
tal protection to shield their children and grandchildren from
higher costs and, perhaps, irreversible destruction. By doing noth
ing now, we are in fact choosing to risk imposing the future costs of
"soil erosion, global warming, groundwater pollution, and vast de
struction of forest habitat"47 on future generations, betting their fu
ture on the hope that some unknown and uninvented something
will come along that makes solving those environmental problems
cheaper and easier. In other words, we are falling victim to Custer's
folly and forcing others to pay for it.
Davidson also points out that we are ignoring the fact that
leaving intact and functional ecosystems to future generations also
has value, both economic and moral:
Instead of starting with a vision of the world we want to leave to
future generations and then allowing economics to help us find
the most efficient way to achieve that goal, we are letting the
economic tail wag the dog by misusing the tools of economics to
define the goals. 48

Neoclassical economic theory cannot make the social and moral de
cisions regarding the proper distribution of wealth and property
within the existing generation nor among the generations, and
"[w]e should not expect neoclassical economic theory to tell us how
much of our natural resource wealth we should leave intact for the
use of future generations."49 Davidson offers no magic solution,
however, except a vision of the decision-making process: "[w]e
must weave together our instinctive parental precaution with trans
parent economic analyses as we make decisions that affect the envi
ronmental inheritance passed on to the next generation."50
Davidson does, however, offer a series of practical steps for
both governments (the top-down approach) and individuals (the
bottom-up approach) to take to begin to achieve his vision of eco
logical economics. Somewhat surprisingly, given his topic, popula
tion growth and population control become real topics only in the
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 74.
Id.
ld. at 76.
ld. at 79.
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last chapter, when Davidson suddenly reveals them to be the foun
dation of his structure of environmental economics. In particular,
Davidson advocates not filling the planet to capacity with human
beings:
[H]ow many people the earth can support is the wrong question
to be asking. Rather, we should be asking if we already have
enough people and perhaps too many people. If the neoclassical
economic model is right-that each additional person is a valua
ble worker, consumer, contributor to the GNP, and stimulator of
innovative technologies that can substitute for all natural re
sources-then we have nothing to worry about as the population
grows. If the second law of technodynamics is correct-that the
increasingly difficult challenges of consuming nonsubstitutable
resources, providing food, and disposing of garbage for a rapidly
expanding population leaves us and future generations with
fewer options and more problems to resolve-then we already
have too many people on the earth.51

One of Davidson's eight "top-down" recommendations, there
fore, is that countries with income taxes should eliminate tax deduc
tions for more than two children. 52 He also recommends that
countries should stop building new roads, because "[t]ruly sustaina
ble development that will bring large numbers of people out of pov
erty will require intelligent intensification of agricultural and
industrial productivity in the areas already accessible by existing
roads."53 In addition, Davidson suggests that taxes on income be
reduced while taxes on consumption are increased; that govern
ments eliminate subsidies that encourage wasteful and destructive
use of water and public lands; that farmers be encouraged to make
more efficient use of their land, to prevent soil erosion, and to mini
mize use of fertilizers and pesticides; and that governments elimi
nate subsidies for industrial fishing. 54 Finally, he recommends that
countries ratify the Kyoto Agreement to reduce greenhouse emis
sions, and that countries negotiate international agreements to
maintain forest cover and to manage forests "to maximize genetic
diversity of plants and animals."55
Davidson's "bottom-up" recommendations stress personal re
sponsibility for the environment and the policy decisions that are
51.
52.

53.
54.
55.

[d.
[d.
/d.
[d.
[d.

at
at
at
at
at

188.
198.
197-98.
198-200.
200.
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made regarding its use. He suggests, for example, that readers edu
cate others by lending You Can't Eat GNP to persons who would
not otherwise read it56 and by en~uring that their legislators under
stand the importance and value of intact ecosystems. Davidson also
encourages readers to analyze and change their own consumption
habits and to work toward changing "the way our society currently
values and uses our resources."57
In the end, however, Davidson is content with making a mod
est beginning in changing his readers' perceptions of their connec
tion to the environment. Despite his potentially revolutionary goal
of a whole new economic structure, he admits in the end that
"[c]hanging a way of thinking as deeply entrenched as neoclassical
economics appears daunting, and I cannot put my finger on exactly
how it will come about. Persistent, pervasive, and popular pressure
will surely be a part of it."58 The law, too, could certainly have a
role. Davidson recognizes this most clearly in his "top-down" rec
ommendations, many of which, such as the elimination of various
government subsidies and various tax reforms, could have profound
ramifications for American environmental policy and politics.
Davidson, however, is a scientist, not a lawyer, and his book
leaves largely unexplored the full and creative potential for law to
help bring about the "sea change" in thought that he seeks. In par
ticular, Davidson's goals for ecological economics cry out for laws
and policies that make humans' connections to their environment
protectable and enforceable. Other writers have already suggested
the concept of an "eco-tort" as one means of incorporating the con
cept of ecosystem services into environmental law. Such sugges
tions, however, often begin with an expanded concept of private
property-as J. B. Ruhl has described it, "a new form of tort, an
eco-tort, to capture damage to one's ecosystem serVIce
ownership. "59
Another form of eco-tort is possible, however-one rooted in a
bioethical conception of personal integrity and autonomy rather
than in property rights. In medicine, the law has effectively pro
tected the integrity and personal autonomy of patients through doc
trines such as informed consent, the patient's right to refuse
treatment, and physician nonmalfeasance. Moreover, the law of
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medical bioethics has accomplished such protection while operating
under two serious constraints. First, American law is unwilling (in
deed, is constitutionally unable) to recognize a property right in a
person's own body. Basic property rights, after all, almost always
include the right to sell, transfer, damage, and destroy the property
involved. If applied to human beings, these rights would legalize
slavery and murder. Second, principles of medical bioethics also
recognize, implicitly and explicitly, that one person's rights of au
tonomy and self-integrity are limited: (1) by other individuals'
claims to similar rights, demonstrated most graphically through the
ongoing debates regarding the status of a fetus and the recognition
of the so-called maternal-fetal conflict; (2) by certain kinds of medi
cal necessity, as when doctors treat unconscious or otherwise in
competent patients; (3) by generally-accepted norms of medical
ethics, as the strong resistance to legalized euthanasia and physi
cian-assisted suicide continue to emphasize; and (4) by the needs of
the greater community, as when involuntary quarantine becomes a
legitimate infringement of individual autonomy during outbreaks of
highly communicable diseases.
What if the concepts of personal integrity and autonomy were
expanded to include those ecosystem services upon which a per
son's life depends? If the ultimate environmental goal is, as David
son argues, to recognize humanity's intimate dependence on intact
and sustainable ecosystems and to create political and economic
systems that strongly value protecting those ecosystems and their
services through mUltiple generations, then a non-property-based
legal regime offers environmental law the same balanced advan
tages that it does to medical bioethics. Ecological integrity can be
legally protected without converting ecosystem services into pri
vately-owned, and therefore transferable and destructible, com
modities. Environmental bioethics would thus protect the
environment without giving individuals the power to interfere with
other individuals' and the larger community's dependence on, and
rights regarding, those same ecosystems. In addition, a legal regime
of environmental bioethics would rescue the concept of human con
nectedness to the environment from the quasi-religious overtones it
acquired in the 1960s and 1970s, stressing that environmental dam
age is about real human injury and real human survival, not some
mystical "oneness with the universe."
Eco-torts based on a notion of environmental bioethics would,
in effect, recognize an expanded concept of legal "personhood,"
one that includes the environmental systems necessary to support a
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human life. As such, bioethical eco-torts are a fairly radical legal
concept, and implementing them would require courts and legisla
tures to accept a very different definition of what it means to be a
human being than that which currently exists in the law. Neverthe
less, it is worth noting that tort law already does extend personal
injury beyond the bounds of a person's own skin, as in wrongful
death and loss of consortium claims. Moreover, as a practical mat
ter, most eco-torts would probably result in class-action litigation,
because the chances are great that ecosystem damage, unlike medi
cal decisions, would affect far more than one person at a time. Fi
nally, bioethical eco-torts would probably also require courts and
legislatures to adjust standard legal principles of standing (strongly
implying that bioethical eco-torts should be state law causes of ac
tion, not federal) and causation.
On the other hand, if the goal truly is to bring about a "sea
change" in Americans' conception of the environment, to convince
them that intact ecosystems and ecosystem services have sufficient
value to counter the short-term profits from exploitative and unsus
tainable use, we could do worse than creating a new legal cause of
action that forces people to conceptualize the environment as part
of themselves instead of something "other." The existence of
bioethical eco-torts would encourage every individual to learn
about and keep watch over the environmental processes upon
which that individual's quality of life depends, whether those
processes be the water purification processes in the Catskill water
shed or the natural soil regeneration processes that created this
country's farmlands. The identification of environmental damage
with personal injury rather than property damage could thus effec
tively repair the disjunction between the value we place on the eco
nomic quality of human life and the value we place (or don't place)
on "the environment" in the abstract.
What Davidson and ecological economists really seek to teach
us, as I have presented them, is that we are intimately, personally,
and directly dependent on our environment and the life-sustaining
services it provides. But if the popular conception of the environ
ment is going to change, people need a pro-ecosystem mental image
strong enough to withstand the repeated assaults of personal desire
and greed. A legally-enforceable notion of environmental bioethics
that recognized our absolute dependence on intact and functional
ecosystems could not only legally protect ecosystems and their ser
vices but also re-figure our short-sighted GNP-producing con
sumerism into a morally repugnant, and legally expensive,
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environmental cannibalism. After all, the point is not so much that
we cannnot eat GNP, but rather that we should not eat ourselves
or our children.

